Information Leak due OEBB Railjet WiFi

November 4, 2013

Today I traveled with the OEBB Railjet which provides a free WiFi. As the journey took some hours I had time to look at my networks traces and found something. After the captive portal with the Terms of Services was acknowledged, a page with some infos is shown. One of the infos is the original URL the user requested. If the users clicks on the link a separate tab opens with the page. The problem is that the URL the browser was given to access this info page has following format:

http://10.20.43.1:4990/www/portal/index.html?res=notyet&uamip=10.20.43.1&uamport=3990&challenge=7e623f476a0cd811b414ad6aa9cfce13&called=00-C0-3A-9D-55-E8&mac=xx-xx-xx-xx-xx-xx&ip=10.20.43.33&nasid=nas01&sessionid=5277d1c60000000b&userurl=http%3a%2f%2fwww.orf.at%2f

Which is sent as referrer to the original requested page if you click onto the link. As you see this referrer contains the full MAC address of the requesting device. Normally the MAC address is only visible via Layer 2 but with the information leak in my case www.orf.at knows my MAC address and if I have already gotten a cookie, they could add now my MAC to the list of know IDs. Ok, I guess the ORF doesn’t do that, but others might.

A solution would be simple for the OEBB, but until then don’t click on this link – type the URL again.

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